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a b s t r a c t
We show that the proportional response dynamics, a utility based distributed dynamics,
converges to the market equilibrium in the Fisher market with constant elasticity of
substitution (CES) utility functions. By the proportional response dynamics, each buyer
allocates his budget proportional to the utility he receives from each good in the previous
time period. Unlike the tâtonnement process and its variants, the proportional response
dynamics is a large step discrete dynamics, and the buyers do not solve any optimization
problem at each step. In addition, the goods are always cleared and assigned to the buyers
proportional to their bids at each step. Despite its simplicity, the dynamics converges fast
for strictly concave CES utility functions, matching the best upper-bound of computing the
market equilibrium via the solution of a global convex optimization problem.
© 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Themarket equilibrium characterizes the efficient outcome in a competitivemarket and is a central notion in Economics.
Whilemany recent studies have been devoted to computing themarket equilibrium, it is desirable, from both economic and
computational perspective, to know how such equilibrium emerges when the agents dynamically respond to the market
condition in a distributed fashion. In this paper, we show that for certain widely studiedmarkets, namely, the Fisher market
with constant elasticity of substitution (CES) utility functions, there is a utility based proportional response dynamics that
converges to the market equilibrium, and when the elasticity is smaller than 1, the dynamics converge fast, matching the
bound obtained by solving a global convex program via the ellipsoid or interior point method.
We consider the Fisher market in which there are distinct sellers and buyers. Further, each seller has one unit of divisible
good for sale (so we do not distinguish seller and good), and each buyer i has a budget bi and a utility function with the form
ui(x1, . . . , xn) =∑j(wijxj)ρi for some 0 < ρi ≤ 1. Such utility functions are the standard constant elasticity of substitution
(CES) utility functions.1 It includes the well studied linear Fisher market by setting ρi = 1 for each i. We consider the
market rule that after the buyers place bids to the goods, each good is allocated to a buyer proportional to the buyer’s bid,
or equivalently, the price of a good is the sum of the bids placed to that good. By the proportional response dynamics, the
buyer submits bids in discrete time steps and adjusts his bids according to the utility he receives from each good in the
previous time step. Formally, if we denote by bij(t) the bid of buyer i to good j at time t , then bij(t + 1) = bi uij(t)ui(t) , where
uij(t) = (wij bij(t)pj(t) )ρi is the utility received by the buyer i from the good j, pj(t) =
∑
i bij(t) is the total bids submitted to the
good j, and ui(t) =∑j uij(t) is the total utility of the buyer i.
From the above description, we can see that the proportional response dynamics is characteristically different from the
standard tâtonnement market dynamics. In the tâtonnement process, the price of each good is gradually adjusted according
∗ Tel.: +1 6506930788.
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1 The standard form is actually ui(xi1, . . . , xin) = (∑j(wijxij)ρi )1/ρi , to make it homogeneous with degree one.
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to the excess of demand in the previous time step. The proportional response dynamics does not explicitly involve a price
mechanism as it is based on the user’s utility. Consequently, it requires much less information and no need to solve an
optimization problem at each step. It is naturally distributed and guarantees the market clearance at each step. In addition,
it is a large step discrete dynamics in the sense that the buyer does not gradually change his bid, and therefore there is
no need to choose a sufficiently small step size as typically done in tâtonnement process. Yet, for CES utility functions, we
show that the proportional response dynamics converges to the market equilibrium, and in the case when each ρi < 1, the
proportional response dynamics converges much faster than the discretized tâtonnement process.
In the tâtonnement process, at each time step, the buyer computes the optimum bundle. Such strategy bears similarity
to the best response dynamics in multi-player games. In contrast, in the proportional response dynamics, each buyer adapts
his bid according to the utility received in the previous time step. This is similar to the family of dynamics based on the
payoff reinforcement learning. Examples include the replicator dynamics in evolutionary games [15] and the multiplicative
update algorithm in zero-sum games [14]. In these dynamics, the probability of playing each strategy is adjusted by a
multiplicative factor determined by the payoff corresponding to that strategy. Aswe shall see later in the convergence proof,
the proportional response can be reformulated as amultiplicative process. As one contribution of our work, we demonstrate
that there exists utility based dynamics that converges to the market equilibrium, a general equilibrium.
Related work. The Fisher market is a special case of the general exchange market. According to [5], it was first defined by
American economist Irving Fisher. The linear Fisher market is equivalent to the pari-mutuel method studied in [13]. In [13],
Eisenberg and Gale established that the market equilibrium, which they call equilibrium probabilities, is the solution to a
convex program, now commonly referred to as the Eisenberg–Gale program, and laid the foundation for many subsequent
works. In the Computer Science community, Deng et al. [10] first presented a polynomial time algorithm to approximate
themarket equilibrium in the linear market with bounded number of goods. Devanur et al. [11] proposed a polynomial time
combinatorial algorithm for computing the market equilibrium for the linear Fisher market. In [16,21], polynomial time
algorithms are presented for computing the market equilibrium by solving the Eisenberg–Gale program.
There has also been a long history in studying the dynamics for converging to the market equilibrium. One particularly
well studied dynamics is the tâtonnement process in which the price changes gradually according to the excess of demand.
Tâtonnement dynamics was first described byWalras in his monumental work published in 1874 and later formulated and
extensively studied in Economics. It was shown in [1–3] that tâtonnement converges locally for economies satisfying weak
gross substitutability (WGS). In [19], Norvig showed that a greedy bidding strategy, which can be regarded as a variant of
the tâtonnement process, converges to the market equilibrium in the set up considered by Eisenberg and Gale in [13]. More
recently, in [7,6], it was shown that the discretized tâtonnement process converges for WGS utility functions, and Cole and
Fleischer [8] showed that an asynchronous variant also converges. In [4], a dynamics is presented for a perturbed keyword
auction mechanism and shown to converge to the market equilibrium. That dynamics can also be regarded as a variant of
the tâtonnement process.
The proportional response dynamics has been studied in [20] for a market that models the bandwidth allocation in the
peer to peer file sharing system. One important property in that model is that each good, the upload bandwidth, brings
the same utility to the interested users. This is not the case in a Fisher market. Consequently, we can no longer apply
the techniques in [20]. In particular, the proportional response is not equivalent to a matrix scaling process, an important
tool used in that paper. In this paper, we show that the Kullback–Leibler divergence between the allocation defined by the
dynamics and the market equilibrium approaches 0. Our proof is facilitated by the connection between the Eisenberg–Gale
program and the market equilibrium. This also renders the proof simpler and the technique more general than that in [20].
Admittedly, compared to the tâtonnement process, the proportional response dynamics applies tomore specificmarkets.
It remains an interesting direction to discover similar dynamics that converge to the market equilibrium in more general
economies.
2. Preliminaries
Fisher market. A Fisher market is a bipartite market which distinguishes the role of buyer and seller. Each buyer i has a
budget bi, and each seller has a unit of divisible good for sale (and therefore we do not distinguish the sellers and the goods).
Suppose that there are m buyers and n goods. Each buyer’s utility is defined as a function of the amount of each good he
receives. In this paper, we consider the family of markets where a buyer’s utility function has the form:
ui(xi1, . . . , xin) =
n−
j=1
(wijxij)ρi ,
where 0 < ρi ≤ 1, wij ≥ 0, and xij represents the amount of good j allocated to the user i. Such utility functions have the
constant elasticity of substitution (CES) property and are standard in Economics. One special case is the linear Fisher market
obtained by setting ρi = 1 for all i. Without loss of generality, we assume that for each i, there exists j such that wij > 0,
and for each j, there exists i, such thatwij > 0. We denote by ρM = maxi ρi ≤ 1.
Market equilibrium. Now consider allocating goods in the Fishermarket through the following pricemechanism: if the good
j is set a price pj, then xij = bij/pj, where bij is the amount of money the buyer i allocates (or bids) to the good j. Facing a
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price vector p = (p1, p2, . . . , pn), the buyer i can compute the optimal allocation of his budget by solving the following
optimization problem.
max ui(bi1/p1, . . . , bin/pn) , s.t. (1)−
j
bij ≤ bi ,
∀j bij ≥ 0.
If it happens that for the price vector p, there exists b = {bij}i,j such that for each i, bi = {bij}j is a solution to the
optimization problem for buyer i, and for each j,
∑
i bij = pj, we call the price vector together with b or the corresponding
allocation vector x = {xij := bij/pj}i,j amarket equilibrium.
It is known that
Lemma 1. [13,12] The Fisher market with CES utility functions always has an equilibrium. At the equilibrium, each good’s price
and each buyer’s utility is unique.
Remark. The results in [12] apply to the utility functions that are concave, homogeneous, continuous, and non-constant. It
is easily verified that the CES utility function satisfies these properties.
Approximate market equilibrium. The notion of approximate market equilibria is useful for measuring the closeness of
an allocation to an equilibrium. Suppose that p∗ is the market equilibrium price. Following [10,17], the bidding vector
b = {bij}i,j, with price vector p = {pj =∑i bij}j is an ε-approximate market equilibrium if
1. For each j, (1− ε)p∗j ≤ pj ≤ (1+ ε)p∗j .
2. For each i, ui ≥ (1− ε)u˜i where u˜i is the maximum utility of buyer i given the price vector p.
We also define a stronger notion of the approximate market equilibrium. A bidding vector b = {bij} is called a strong
ε-approximate market equilibrium if there exists a market equilibrium b∗ such that for all i, j, (1 − ε)b∗ij ≤ bij ≤ (1 + ε)b∗ij .
It is easily seen that in the Fisher market with concave utility functions, a strong ε-approximate market equilibrium is an
O(ε)-approximate market equilibrium. The reverse might not be true.
Proportional response dynamics. As standard in the study of market dynamics, we consider the setup where at each time
step the buyers face the same market parameters, i.e. the same set of goods, budget constraint, and utility function while
the buyers make their bidding decisions according to the previous market actions.
Denote by bij(t) the bid of buyer i on the good j at time t . The proportional response dynamics considered in this paper
is defined as bij(t + 1) = bi uij(t)ui(t) , where pj(t) =
∑
i bij(t), uij(t) = (wijbij(t)/pj(t))ρi , and ui(t) =
∑
j uij(t). Therefore, at
each step, each buyer allocates the bid proportional to the utility he receives from each good in the previous time period. In
addition, we require that bij > 0 wheneverwij > 0. We have the following.
Lemma 2. A market equilibrium is a fixed point of the proportional response dynamics.
Proof. Consider a market equilibrium with the price vector p and the bidding vector b. By the definition, the market
equilibrium is the solution of the optimization problem (1).
Using Lagrangian multipliers, we have that for each i, there exists λi such that if bij > 0, then ρi

wij
pj
ρi
bρi−1ij = λi. Thus,
uij =

wijbij
pj
ρi = bijλi/ρi. That is, for any j, k with bij, bik > 0, uij/uik = bij/bik. Hence, b is a fixed point of the proportional
response dynamics. 
Main results. The main result of the paper is
Theorem 3. The proportional response dynamics converges to a market equilibrium in the Fisher market with CES utility
functions.
As for the convergence rate, we distinguish two cases, when ρM < 1 and when ρM = 1. Without loss of generality,
let
∑
i bi = 1 and
∑
jwij = 1 for every i. Let W1 = 1minwij>0 wij , W2 =
1
mini bi
, and W = nW1W2. We assume that initially
bij(0) = Ω

bi
nO(1)

ifwij > 0. This includes the case where each buyer splits his bid evenly among all the goods. Throughout
this paper, log denotes the base 2 logarithm. We have the following result on the convergence rate.
Theorem 4. When ρM < 1, it takes O

log(W/ε)
(1−ρM )2

steps to reach a strong ε-approximate market equilibrium. When ρM = 1, it
takes O(W 3/ε2) steps to reach an ε-approximate market equilibrium.
Since each step takes O(mn) arithmetic operations, when ρM < 1, the overall running time is bounded by O(mn(log
(W/ε))/(1 − ρM)2). We remark that this bound is comparable to the bound of O((mn logW )O(1) log(1/ε)) obtained by
solving a convex program via the ellipsoid or interior point methods and much faster than the discretized tâtonnement
process [6,8].
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3. The convergence proof
Our proof relies on a characterization of market equilibrium by Eisenberg and Gale. In [13], it is shown that the market
equilibrium in the linear Fisher market is the solution to a convex program. Their result easily extends to CES utility
functions [12]. Consider the Eisenberg–Gale program defined as
max
−
i
bi
ρi
log ui , s.t. (2)
∀i ui =
−
j
(wijxij)ρi ,
∀j
−
i
xij ≤ 1 ,
∀i, j xij ≥ 0.
The following statement is due to [13,12].
Lemma 5. For the Fisher market with CES utility functions, an allocation x = {xij} is an equilibrium if and only if it is a solution
to (2). Further, the value of each ui is unique at a solution of (2).
Now we proceed to prove the convergence of the proportional response dynamics.
Proof (Theorem 3). The convergence proof consists of two steps. Consider the sequence of bids b(t) = {bij(t)} for t =
0, 1, . . .. We first show that any limit point of this sequence is a market equilibrium. This is done by showing that the
Kullback–Leibler(KL) divergence between bij(t) and the market equilibrium converges. This is sufficient to guarantee the
convergence when there is a unique market equilibrium, such as in the case where ρM < 1. When ρM = 1, an additional
argument is needed to show that there can be at most one limit point starting from any given initial condition.
(1) Any limit point of the dynamics is a market equilibrium.
For any two vectors x = {x1, . . . , xn} and y = {y1, . . . , yn} with non-negative entries, let KL(x‖y) denote the KL-
divergence
KL(x‖y) =
−
i
xi log(xi/yi).
Remark. As standard, we assume that 0 log 0 = 0 and 0 log(0/x) = 0 for any x ≥ 0.
The following properties are well known for the KL divergence, see for example [9].
Lemma 6. Assuming x, y are non-negative vectors, and
∑
i xi =
∑
i yi, then
1. KL(x‖y) ≥ 0, and the equality holds only when x = y;
2. KL(x‖y) ≥ 1ln 2
∑
i(
√
xi −√yi)2;
3. For a sequence of non-negative vectors xi with ‖xi‖1 = ‖y‖1 for each i = 1, 2, . . ., if limi→∞ KL(xi‖y) = 0, then
limi→∞ xi = y.
Given any bidding vector b, we denote by bi = {bi1, . . . , bin} the bidding by the i-th buyer. Take any market equilibrium
b∗ = {b∗ij}. We define the potential function
Φ(t) =
−
i
1
ρi
Φi(t),
whereΦi(t) = KL(b∗i ‖bi(t)).
To gain intuition on the definition of the potential function, we have the following dependence of bij(t + 1) on bij(t).
bij(t + 1) = bi uij(t)ui(t) =

wij
pj(t)
ρi bi
ui(t)
bij(t)ρi .
Hence, the dynamics can be regarded as a multiplicative process which motivates the use of the KL divergence in the po-
tential function.
Wewill now show thatΦ(t) converges,which in turn implies that any limit point of the dynamics is amarket equilibrium.
Let u∗i represent the utility of the buyer i and p
∗
j the price of good j at the equilibrium. When b
∗
ij > 0, by Lemma 2, we
have that b∗ij/bi = u∗ij/u∗i . Therefore
b∗ij log
b∗ij
bij(t + 1) = b
∗
ij log
b∗ijui(t)
biuij(t)

since bij(t + 1) = uij(t)ui(t) bi

= b∗ij log
u∗ijui(t)
u∗i uij(t)
(by Lemma 2 b∗ij/bi = u∗ij/u∗i )
= b∗ij log
u∗ij
uij(t)
− b∗ij log
u∗i
ui(t)
. (3)
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Since u∗ij = (wijb∗ij/p∗j )ρi and uij(t) = (wijbij(t)/pj(t))ρi , we have that
u∗ij
uij(t)
=
 b∗ij/bij(t)
p∗j /pj(t)
ρi
. Plugging it in (3), we have that
b∗ij log
b∗ij
bij(t + 1) = ρib
∗
ij log
b∗ij
bij(t)
− ρib∗ij log
p∗j
pj(t)
− b∗ij log
u∗i
ui(t)
. (4)
Hence, we have that
Φ(t + 1) =
−
i
1
ρi
Φi(t + 1)
=
−
i
1
ρi
−
j
b∗ij log
b∗ij
bij(t + 1)
=
−
i
1
ρi
−
j

ρib∗ij log
b∗ij
bij(t)
− ρib∗ij log
p∗j
pj(t)
− b∗ij log
u∗i
ui(t)

=
−
i
Φi(t)−
−
j
−
i
b∗ij log
p∗j
pj(t)
−
−
i
1
ρi
−
j
b∗ij log
u∗i
ui(t)
(since
∑
i b
∗
ij = p∗j and
∑
j b
∗
ij = bi)
=
−
i
Φi(t)−
−
j
p∗j log
p∗j
pj(t)
−
−
i
bi
ρi
log
u∗i
ui(t)
=
−
i
Φi(t)− KL(p∗‖p(t))−
−
i
bi
ρi
log
u∗i
ui(t)
.
Write Ψ (t) = KL(p∗‖p(t))+∑i biρi log u∗iui(t) . ThenΦ(t + 1) =∑iΦi(t)− Ψ (t). We have that
Lemma 7. 1. For each i,Φi(t) ≥ 0, andΦi(t) ≤ Φ(t).
2. Ψ (t) ≥ 0, and Ψ (t)→ 0 if and only if ui(t)→ u∗i for each i and pj(t)→ p∗j for each j.
3. Φ(t + 1) ≤ ρMΦ(t)− Ψ (t) ≤ Φ(t)− Ψ (t).
Proof. 1. Follows from that
∑
j b
∗
ij =
∑
j bij(t) = bi for each i.
2. Since
∑
j p
∗
j =
∑
j pj(t) =
∑
i bi, we have that KL(p
∗‖p(t)) ≥ 0 by Lemma 6.1. By Lemma 5, ∑i biρi log ui(t) ≤∑
i
bi
ρi
log u∗i . That is,
∑
i
bi
ρi
log u
∗
i
ui(t)
≥ 0. Therefore Ψ (t) ≥ 0.
WhenΨ (t)→ 0, then both KL(p∗‖p(t))→ 0 and∑i biρi log u∗iui(t) → 0. The former implies that p(t)→ p∗ by Lemma 6.3,
and the latter implies that ui(t)→ u∗i for each i.
3. SinceΦi(t) ≥ 0 and ρM = maxi ρi, we have that
Φ(t + 1) =
−
i
Φi(t)− Ψ (t) ≤
−
i
ρM
ρi
Φi(t)− Ψ (t) = ρMΦ(t)− Ψ (t).
Since ρM ≤ 1 andΦ(t) ≥ 0,Φ(t + 1) ≤ Φ(t)− Ψ (t). 
By the above lemma, we now show that Ψ (t) → 0 when t → ∞. By repeatedly applying Lemma 7.3, we have that
Φ(t + 1) ≤ Φ(0)−∑tτ=0 Ψ (τ ). That is
t−
τ=0
Ψ (τ ) ≤ Φ(0)− Φ(t + 1) ≤ Φ(0). (5)
Since bij(0) > 0 wheneverwij > 0, and b∗ij > 0 only ifwij > 0, we have thatΦ(0) is upper bounded. Together with the fact
that Ψ (t) ≥ 0, (5) implies that Ψ (t) → 0 when t → ∞. By Lemma 7.2, this in turn implies that ui(t) → u∗i for any i and
pj(t)→ p∗j for any j. By Lemma 5, any limit point of the dynamics is a market equilibrium.
(2) The dynamics always converges to a single market equilibrium.
When ρM < 1, the market equilibrium is unique. The proportional dynamics converges to that unique market equilib-
rium from any initial condition. However, when some ρi = 1, theremay existmultiplemarket equilibria.We shall show that
it is impossible that the sequence bij(t) has two distinct limit points. Suppose that b′ = {b′ij} is a limit point of the sequence
b(t0), b(t1), . . .. By 1, we know that b′ is a market equilibrium. Since we can choose anymarket equilibrium in the definition
of Φ , we now choose b∗ = b′. Since b(tk) → b′, we have that Φi(tk) → 0 and therefore Φ(tk) → 0 when k → ∞. Since
Φ(t) is monotonically decreasing, andΦ(t) ≥ 0, we have for any infinite strictly increasing sequence s0, s1, . . .,Φ(sk)→ 0
when k →∞. Therefore, b(sk)→ b′. That is, the dynamics always converges to a single market equilibrium. 
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4. The rate of convergence
We now bound the convergence rate of the proportional response dynamics. We consider two cases, when ρM < 1 and
when ρM = 1. In the former case, we are able to show a fast convergence of the dynamics; and in the latter case, we show
that the dynamics converges in pseudo-polynomial time.
Without loss of generality, we may scale bi and wij such that
∑
i bi = 1 and for each i,
∑
jwij = 1. Recall that W1 =
1
minwij>0 wij
andW2 = 1mini bi ,W = nW1W2. We have that
Lemma 8. At the equilibrium, p∗j ≥ 1W for any j. When ρM < 1, b∗ij ≥

1
W2
1/(1−ρM )
wheneverwij > 0.
Proof. For any j, consider a buyer i with wij > 0. If for every other k, wik = 0, then p∗j ≥ bi ≥ 1/W2. Otherwise, suppose
that there iswik > 0 for some k ≠ j. As in the proof of Lemma 2, we must have
wij
p∗j
ρi
b∗ij
ρi−1 =

wik
p∗k
ρi
b∗ik
ρi−1. (6)
Since b∗ij ≤ p∗j , b∗ik ≤ p∗k , and ρi ≤ 1, we have
wij
p∗j
ρi
p∗j
ρi−1 ≤

wik
b∗ik
ρi
b∗ik
ρi−1.
Rearranging the terms, we have p∗j ≥

wij
wik
ρi
b∗ik ≥ 1W1 b∗ik. Since there exists k such that b∗ik ≥ bi/n, p∗j ≥
bi
nW1
≥ 1W .
When ρM < 1, by choosing k such that b∗ik ≥ bi/n ≥ 1/(nW2) and applying (6) again, we have that
b∗ij = b∗ik

wijp∗k
wikp∗j
ρi/(1−ρi)
≥ b∗ik

1
W1
· 1
nW1W2
ρi/(1−ρi)
≥ b∗ik

1
nW 21W2
ρM/(1−ρM )
≥

1
W 2
1/(1−ρM )
. 
We will need the following technical lemma that bounds the difference between two vectors from their KL divergence.
Lemma 9. For two positive sequences xj and yj for j = 1, . . . , n that satisfy∑j xj =∑j yj, let η = maxj |xj−yj|xj . Then
KL(x‖y) ≥ 1
8
min(1, η)ηmin
j
xj.
Proof. We use the inequality in Lemma 6.2,−
j
xj log(xj/yj) ≥ 1ln 2
−
j
(
√
xj −√yj)2 ≥
−
j
(
√
xj −√yj)2.
Suppose that k = argmaxj |xj−yj|xj . Then
KL(x‖y) ≥ (√xk −√yk)2 =

xk − yk√
xk +√yk
2
= η2 x
2
k
(
√
xk +√yk)2 .
When yk ≤ 2xk, x2k/(
√
xk +√yk)2 ≥ x2k/(
√
xk +√2xk)2 ≥ 18xk.
When yk > 2xk, i.e. when y = (η + 1)xk and η > 1,
x2k
(
√
xk +√yk)2 =
x2k
(
√
xk +√(1+ η)xk)2 =
1
(1+√1+ η)2 xk ≥
1
8η
xk.
The last inequality follows from η > 1. Hence, we have that
KL(x‖y) ≥ 1
8
min(1, η)ηxk ≥ 18 min(1, η)ηminj xj. 
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According to Lemma 9, in order to show maxj
|xj−yj|
xj
≤ ε < 1, it suffices to show that KL(x‖y) = O(ε2)minj xj. Now, we
are ready to prove Theorem 4.
Proof (Theorem 4). (1) When ρM < 1, we show that the dynamics reach a strong ε-approximate market equilibrium. By
Lemma7.2 and 7.3,Φ(t+1) ≤ ρMΦ(t)−Ψ (t) ≤ ρMΦ(t). Applying the inequality iteratively, we have thatΦ(t) ≤ ρtMΦ(0),
andΦi(t) ≤ Φ(t) ≤ ρtMΦ(0).
As observed earlier, Φi(t) = ∑j b∗ij log b∗ijbij(t) is the KL divergence between b∗ij and bij(t). By Lemma 9, bij(t) is a strong
ε-approximate equilibrium as long asΦi(t) ≤ 18ε2 minj:b∗ij>0 b∗ij for ε < 1. Of course, the rate of convergence also depends on
the initial choice of bij(0). By the assumption that bij(0) = binO(1) , Φi(0) =
∑
j b
∗
ij log
b∗ij
bij(0)
= ∑j b∗ij log bibi/nO(1) = O(bi log n).
HenceΦ(0) = O(log n) since∑i bi = 1.
SinceΦ(t) ≤ ρtMΦ(0), by choosing t = c log(W/ε)(1−ρM )2 for sufficiently large c , we have that
Φ(t) ≤ 1
8

1
W 2
1/(1−ρM )
ε2 ≤ 1
8
min
b∗ij>0
b∗ijε
2.
The above inequalities follow from ln 1
ρM
≥ 1−ρM and Lemma 8. By Lemma 9, we have that |b
∗
ij−bij(t)|
b∗ij
≤ ε for any b∗ij > 0,
that is b(t) = {bij(t)} is a strong ε-approximation to b∗.
(2)WhenρM = 1, the convergence could be slower. Indeed, itmay never converge to a strong ε-approximate equilibrium
as at the market equilibrium, some b∗ij may be 0 even when wij > 0. We will show that it converges to the standard notion
of ε-approximate equilibrium in O(W 3/ε2) steps. We will establish the bound in the worst case of ρi = 1 for all i.
By Lemma 7.3, we have that Φ(t + 1) ≤ Φ(t) − Ψ (t). We claim that if Ψ (t) ≤ δ for δ = 1
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ε2, then b(t) is an
ε-approximate equilibrium. Recall that Ψ (t) = KL(p∗‖p(t))+∑i bi log u∗iui(t) . In what follows, we omit (t) for the simplicity
of the notations. Since KL(p∗‖p) ≥ 0 and∑i bi log u∗iui ≥ 0. Since Ψ ≤ δ, we have that
KL(p∗‖p) ≤ δ, (7)−
i
bi log
u∗i
ui
≤ δ. (8)
By (7), Lemmas 8 and 9, we have that for every j, (1 − ε′)p∗j ≤ pj ≤ (1 + ε′)p∗j , where ε′ = ε/(4W2). Let u˜i denote
the maximum utility of buyer i under the price vector p. It remains to show that for each i, ui ≥ (1 − ε)u˜i. For linear
utility functions, the maximum utility of buyer i is achieved by spending all the budget on the goods that maximize wij/pj.
Therefore, u˜i = bi maxjwij/pj, and u∗i = bi maxjwij/p∗j . Hence, we have that u∗i ≥ (1 − ε′)u˜i ≥ (1 − ε′)ui. With ε′ < 1/2,
for any i,
bi log
u∗i
ui
=
−
j
bj log
u∗j
uj
−
−
j≠i
bj log
u∗j
uj
≤ δ −
−
j≠i
bj log(1− ε′)
≤ δ − log(1− ε′) ≤ δ + 2ε′.
Therefore,
u∗i
ui
≤ 2(δ+2ε′)/bi ≤ 2(δ+2ε′)W2 ≤ 1+ ε/2.
The last inequality follows from δ ≪ ε/W2 and ε′ = ε/(4W2). Hence
ui ≥ (1− ε/2)u∗i ≥ (1− ε/2)(1− ε′)u˜i ≥ (1− ε)u˜i.
Therefore, b is an ε-approximate market equilibrium.
By (5),
∑t
τ=0 Ψ (τ ) ≤ Φ(0) = O(log n). Hence, when t ≥ c log n/δ for some constant c > 0, there exists τ ≤ t such
that Ψ (τ ) ≤ δ. We thus have that the dynamics converges to an ε-approximate market equilibrium in O(WW 22 log n/ε2) =
O(W 3/ε2) steps. 
While the above convergence rate for the linear Fisher market is unlikely to be tight, the following example shows that
Ω(1/ε) steps are required to converge to an ε-approximate equilibrium. Consider the market with three buyers and two
goods. The budgets of the buyers are b1 = 2, b2 = 1, and b3 = 1, respectively. Theweights arew11 = w21 = w22 = w32 = 1
and 0 otherwise. At the equilibrium, the prices of both goods are 2, and b∗21 = 0, b∗22 = 1. However, it is easy to see that
when b21 = 2ε, it takesΘ(1/ε) steps to reduce it to ε.
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5. Conclusion
One crucial property used in the convergence proof is the equivalence between the market equilibrium and the solution
to the Eisenberg–Gale program. It would be interesting to know if the technique can extend to other Eisenberg–Galemarkets
as defined in [18]. We note that the proportional response dynamics most naturally applies to separable utility functions,
i.e. the utility of each buyer is the sum of the utility obtained from different goods. It would be interesting to know if similar
dynamics can be defined for more general families of such utility functions. It is also interesting to know if the dynamics
converges under appropriately defined asynchronous models.
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